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In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure
of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of
various types of delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to
their firms.
The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards
actions that are in the long—run interest of the stockhblders. Firms must
take into account (1) their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances
from mismanagement; (2) the extent to which a compensation package forces
the executive to face risks beyond his control; and (3) the willingness of
a given executive to bear this risk.
We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from
the early 1970's. The results are generally in line with the theoretical
predictions.
Professor Jonathan Eaton Professor Harvey Rosen
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Yale University Princeton University
New Haven, Conn. 06520 Princeton, New Jersey 08544"A mental midget can tell whether top management deserves a bonus
based on current profits. It is much harder to figure out whether
top management has positioned the company well for the long run."
(Thurow [1981].)
1.Introduction
Recently, executive incentive structures have become a matter of public
concern. The comments in a New York Timesarticleentitled "Overhauling
America'sBusiness Management" are typical: "American ianagers are too wor-
ried aboutshort term profits ...AlOt of American companies know they have
oldmachines ...Butthe manager figures he'll keep the old machines as long
as they still run, make a big profit one year, and take that record as an ad-
vertisement to get a job elsewhere." (L,ohr [1981, p.42].)Such inappropriate
incentivesare often linked to the 'productivity crisis."
Clearly, it is in the interest of firms that their managers be concerned
with long run profits. Frequently, however, the long run implications of an
executive's job performance cannot be assessed until after the executive has
terminated his relationship with the company. To relate an executive's reward
more closely to his performance, firms can delay a large component of compen-
sation untilbetter information is available, so that the amount of remunera—
tionbecomes dependent upon indicators of performance.
Of course, other factors may also affect the extent to which delayed
compensation is used. Tax considerations, for example, may play an important
role. If the tax rate on unearned income is lower for the firm than for
the individual executive, there may be art advantage to postponing—2—
compensation.1The firm may also have better access to capital
markets.
In this paper we examine the various factors affecting the structure of
executives' compensation packages. We focus on the role of various types of
delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to their firms. The
theoretical framework is established in Part 2. We show how the
preferences of firm owners and executives interact to determine the form of
the equilibrium compensation package. An important aspect of the theory is
2
a generalization of the "theory of agency"to allow for the possibility of
delayed compensation.The model leads us to expect certain
empirical regularities in the way that compensation packages are related to
characteristics of firms and executives. In Part 3, these are explored using
data on a sample of top ranking American executives from the early 1970's. A
concluding section contains a summary and suggestions for future research.
i The extent to which tax considerations, rather than monitoring
problems, determine the firm's decision to delay compensation
has been a subject of debate. Miller and Scholes [19801 argue that tax
considerations dominate, while Lazear 11981) takes the contrary view.
2 See Ross 11974), Jensen and Meckling [19761, and Goldberg [1980) for
useful discussions of agency theory.-3-
2.A Theoretical Framework
We use a simple two—period odelto explain the essential featuresof
the process that determines thecomposition of the executive'scompensation
package. In the first period the
executive expends effort inmanaging the
firm arid receives asalary as compensation. In the secondperiod he is re-
tired, and consumes his savings and
delayed compensation. The stockholders
are assumed to be unable to observehis effort contemporaneously,and hence
cannot make salary contingent onperformance. In the second period firm
owners do receive information on
performance, although that information
may be imperfect. The stockholdersmay then provide additional compensation
in an amount that depends
on their perception of his performance.
2.1 The Executive's Problem
We f±st examine the problem from the
executive's point of view. As-
i sm-te that an executive of type i hasa Utility function u
(c1,c2,e)
where C1 represents period 1consumption, c2 period 2 consumption and
e his effort in managing the firm. Weassume that u.a—
>0 ,j=1,2, i i_au 1 u =— <0 and uis concave inc1 and c2 ,givene e e
Consider an executive i who works f or firm j.Inperiod 1 he
ii ii ii receives before tax wage w1and in period 2 before tax wagew2 (x
ii where x is a measure of the executive's perorance. We assuie that
ii>0. x=x'(e,O)where 0 is a randonj yariable and x
LetW and W denote executive i's incoxrje fron other sources in
periods 1 and 2 respectively. The function IL )denotes after tax incone
as a function of before tax income. Finally, let q(s,w) denote the
after-tax resources available in period 2 from saving an amount
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We denote by c () and
expected utility subject to
ii ii andfunctions w2
realizationof c2 given
maximum value of expected
firm j is thus given by
e* ( )values of C1 aridethat maximize
(2.2), where these optimal values depend upon
x2 ( ), C) and T( ) The
c and e* arid 0 is denoted c(0) .The
utility that executive i can attain working for
E E[u(c,c(0),e*)1
2.2 The Firm's Problem
Like the executive, the firm takes the schedules T( ),( )and
ii ii ii ii
x( )as given. It determines, however, w1andtheschedule w2 Cx
taking into account their effects on e* through the executive's optimizing
behavior discussed above.
Assume for a moment that
of type i .Letf1(e,0)
compensation, when executive
the effort he expends and on
firm is risk neutral it will
firm j has decided to attract an executive
represent firm j's reyenues, gross ofexecutive
i is employed. In general, it depends on
a random variable beyond his control. If the
choose and w3 (x13) to maximize
—4—
The executive, facing a given















3 We treat this interest rate as a constant, a reasonable approximation
for the range of variation considered here. Note that r is an after tax
rate of return.
—5—




where r denotes the interest rate facing the firm.
) and w ( )thepayments that maximize(2.3),where both
ii depend upon e* (),x(), ( )and T( ),and where w
dependsupon the realized ethroughx1()aswell.The maximal
i-j valueof (2.3) is denoted
an equilibrium is asso-
2.3 Equilibrium Compensation Schemes
Given that firmj employsexecutive i
dated withthe fixed point w(
andw(
)attain ,given
given w( )and w( ) .For i
equilibriumone > 1p1J forany 1'
equilibrium compensation structures will depend upon the
preferences u1( ),thefirm's technology f13( )
r(), ( ),x( ),andtheparameter r
The equilibrium payment scheme can be interpreted in terms of Rosen's
[1974] model of hedonic product characteristics and prices: working for
firmj providesexecutive i with a level of expected utility that
depends upon thelevel,timing andrkiness- of conpensation while the—6-
type of compensation firmjoffersexecutive idepends uponits
technology and ability to monitor. With manyheterogeneousfirms andex-
ecutives, awhole set of equilibrium compensation packages will appear,
determining a "market locus" of the type discussed by Rosen [l974J.
Because the optimal package depends upon a complex interaction of
firm and executive characteristics, explicit solutions for the compensa-
tion scheme are difficult to obtain for very general cases. We provide,
instead, a qualitative discussion of how various firm and executive
4
characteristics are likely to affect aspects of compensation. Then, in
Section 2.4, we derive an explicit solution for a particular example.
Other things equal, a firm will prefer to delay a larger share of
comjention when future indicators of executive performance are more
reliable than those presently available. We thus anticipate that delayed
compensation will be used more when monitoring costs are high in the
present relative to the future.
To minimize expected compensation costs the firm will,ceteris paribus,
tie compensation to indicators that are relatively riskfree. This is be-
cause tying compensation to a "noisy"indicator exposes the executive to.
greater income variability.Given our assumption on the concavity of the
utility function, the expected level of compensationmust then be higher
to attract a given executive. Thisline of reasoning suggests that future
firm value is less likely to be used as a performanceindicator the more it
is influenced by factors beyond the executive'scontrol. Future firm value
will, of course, be used more as a performanceindicator when direct measures
4Althoughwe consider theSe to be likejy effects,it may be the case that
for certain fuhctio2l forms and/or parameter valu,they do not obtain.—7—
areunavailable.
Acompensation package that exposes an executive to risk beyond his
control will be especially undesirable to an executive who is risk averse.
Since younger executives have a longer period over which to pool risk,
they should be more willing to receive compensation in risky forms.We
thus anticipate t' younger executives' compensation will come in forms that
depend relatively heavily upon such noisy indicators as the value of the
firmata future date.
We would also anticipate that executives who are in a high income tax
bracketcurrently relative to the one they expect to be in upon retirement
will finddelayed compensation of any form more attractive. By postponing
corpensation thefirm reduces such executives' lifetime tax obligations,
andhence can attract them for a smaller number of pre—tax dollars.
In the next section we present an example that illustrates some of
these relationships mathematically.
2.4 A Simple Illustration
We consider a firm whose profit, gross of executive compensation, is
given by Z =O1e,where is a random variable equaling y
with probability 1-ri and 0 with probability ir .Anexecutive may choose
either to put forth effort, in which case e=l ,orelse to "shirk,"5
5 The term "shirking" should be interpreted broadly. In our context
it means taking actions that are not in the long-run interest in the firm.
For example, these may take the form of maximizing sales or personnel, possibly
as a means of achieving fame and a job elsewhere, or simply for the
pleasure of exercising power.—8—
inwhich case e=O . , then,is 0 if e=0 ,while,if e=l ,it
is0 with probabilityn• and y otherwise. The stockholders cannot
observe e or but only Z1J ,whichbecomes known after w is
paid. Given a decision to hire executive andgiventhat executivei
expends effort, expected firmprofits, gross of compensation, are(l—rr)y1
Note that, in this example, the variableTr measures simultaneously the riskiness
of the firm (in the sense of a probability of a bad outcome), and the difficulty
of monitoring executive performance.
We assume that all executives have an indirect utility function of the form
u(w1,w2,e) =logw1+clog w2 +(l—e)
(2.4)
(Thisfunction embodiesnot only Underlying preferences but taxparametersand
investmentopportunities as well.) An executive of typeicanattain an
expectedutility level U1 elsewhere.
Since Z1 can assume only two values, a non—random compensation
packagecan involve only two possible levels of compensationin period 2,
G ij ij B
which we denote w2 ,correspndingto the cutcoine Z=y ,andw2
corresponding to the state =0
Given that the executive expends effort (e=1) ,acompetitive compen—
ation package must satisfy:
B G —i
logw1+cXlrlog w2+cL(l-Tr) logw2 > U. (2.5)
6concavity of u guarantees that a random compensation packageis strict-
ly inferior to a non-random one. Hence we onlyconsider the second type.—9—
that is, an executive who joins the firmandexerts effort must find the
expected reward to exceed his compensation elsewhere.
If the executive chooses not to exert effort, Z' =0with certainty.
To provide an incentive to exert effort the compensationpackage must also
satisfy
log w1+log w +1<logw1+a7rlog w+CZ(1—71)log w ,(2.6)
B G whichcan only obtain ifw2 < w2
Toattract an executive and toprovide himan incentive to work the firm
must provide a compensation package (w11w,w) satisfying(2.5) and (2.6).
A risk-neutral firm will choose to do so in away that nünimizes the expected
compensation cost, B G
Trw2 +(l-Tr)w +i+r (2.7)
Clearly the constraint (2.5) will be binding. Otherwise, w1 coula be
reduced to provide a savings or wage costs without affecting (2.6). Further-
more, concavity of the executive's utility function guarantees that (2.6) will
in. the limit be binding as well. Intuitively, the distancebetween w
andw must be as small as possible to keep dowi the size ofthe risk premi
required by the executive, without inducing shirking.




B -14+a u 1
w2 =Xexp(1-
-) (2.9)





Thetotal expected cost of thecompensationpackage is
ct/1+c U
(l+cL)Xexp()





As this difference becomes larger, delayed compensation becomes riskier,
and more dependent upon firm performance. Note that this expression falls
as rises and rises with 'T .Executiveswho value consumption in the
future more heavily, e.g., older executives who discount retirement income
less, will, ceteris paribus, receive delayed compensation that is less tiedto the
indicator of firm performance. On the other hand, executives workingfor firms where
the exogenous probability of a bad outcome is important (inthe form of higher
value of ii ), willbe penalized relatively more if firm performance is
poor, or rewarded relatively more if it is good.Note that (2.12) is in-
dependent of y1 .Wemay thus change it and y in a way that keeps
expected profits constant, while only the change in 11 affects.the form of
compensation. A change in r ,theinterest rate facing the firm, also leaves
the spread unchanged.
The percentage differences between w and w1 and between w and
are approxirnat-Y— —
G it
log w2 -logw1 =logx(l) (2.13)
logw-logw1=_log+ (2.14)
respectively.Not surprisingly, both increase in r :the firm postpones
more compensation into the future when its interest costs are high.
The effect of changes in a and itare, in general, ambiguous. However,
if the chance of a bad outn is low(i.e., around the point Tr=O
and w both rise relative to
w1witha (delayed compensation is
used more when it is valued.more) and both rise relativeto w1 with it
(delayed compensation is used more by riskier firms). As theprobability
of failure rises, however, these resultsare reversed.Then it
isnear 1 an increase in a and an increase in itreducedelayed compensation.
Intuitively, when the risk of failure is high, increasing valuation placed
on future income reduces the extent to which risky, delayed coriensation is
used relative to current compensation. Similarly, when the level of risk
is already very high, an increase in risk makes current compensation relative-
ly attractive. Again, y1J does not enter (2.13) or (2.14), so that these re-
lationships are independent of the expected profitability of the firm.
This example i simple, arid abstracts from a number of the considerations
we discussed in Section 2.3. In particular, it does not allow us to distinguish
monitoring costs from firm risk. Nevertheless, the example demonstrates the
complexity of the relationships between the firm's characteristics, executive's
preferences, and the optimal compensation package.— 12—
3.npirical Analysis
In this Section we use our theory to analyze compensation data for a
group of high ranking American executives during 1970-73. Todo so, we must
first recognize that actual compensation practices are considerably more
complicated and varied than suggested in the theoretical discussion. As
Lewellen [1968] notes, probably the minimum number of meaningful compen-
sation types is four: salary and bonus, pensions,
deferred compensation, and stock options. A method must be devised to measure
the values of each of these components in comparable units. The other major
problem in exploring the theory's empirical implications is the selection of
a relevant set of company characteristics. These characteristics are supposed
to measure the extent to which:(a) the executive's activities can be monitored,
and (b) the firm's performance is subject to risk beyond the executive's control.
In Section 3.1 the variables used are described. _ln Section 3.2 we
specify an econometric model. The results are presented in Section 3.3.
3.1 Data
We first discuss the components of executive pay, and then
turn to the characteristics of their companies.
3.1.1 Executive Characteristics andCompensation7
We use Lewe11en 11975] data on the compensation of the. five highest
executives in 22 large manufacturing companies during the period 1970 to 1973,
7 These data were kindly provided to us by Professor Wilbur G. Lewellen of Purdue
University. For further detail on their construction, see Lewellen [1968], [1972],
and [1975].— 13—
8
inclusive. The firms are listed by their 1973corporate names in Appendix
A. Attention is focused on the top fivepositions because it is only for
these that useable annual data oncompensation are publicly available from
corporateproxy statements. Clearly, this sample of firmsisnot random.
Thus, although we think that our results are of considerableinterest, they
cannot be regarded as a definitive "test" of thetheory.
Lewellen provides data on the executive'sage, rank in the company, and
total compensation. In order tocompare the pension, deferred compensation,
arid stock option components of thepay packages, he converts them into current
income equivalents —-". . .theamounts of immediate cash income that would be
as valuable, after taxes, to the executiverecipients under consideration"
11973, p. 160]. We discuss briefly below each form of compensation.
Salary and Bonuses
Salary and bonuses are aggregate direct current remunerationand comprise
on average 64% of the value of total compensation inour sample. All such
payments are taxable to the individual at ordinary personal incometax rates
when received, and are prominently reportedon corporate proxy statements. To
compute their after tax value is not straightforward, because informationis
needed on deductions, and income from sources other thanthe corporate employer.
Using Internal Revenue Service data, Lewellen determines the average ratio o
exemptions and deductions to gross income for individuals in each tax bracket
and assumes that each executive takes exemptions and deductions as theaverage
person in his income bracket. "Outsideincome"is essentially impossible to
establish with any certainty.Lewellen assumes that such income equals 15% of
direct current remuneration.
8Data on two of the executives were incomplete, so our sample was reduced from
110 to 108 observations.— 14-
Theestimates of the executives' marginal tax rates are probably not very
sensitive to these assumptions. The average salary plus bonusesin our sample
exceeds $100,000. By virtue of corporate remuneration alone,most of the
executives were probably subject to the maximumtaxon earned incorne,regardleSS
of assumptions on income from other sources.
Pensions
A pension gives an executive the right to receive a seriesof periodic
payments of a given (nominal) size beginning atthe future retirement date
and continuing throughout his lifetime. An importantinstitutional fact is
that pension benefits for executives are made on the samebasis as for other
employees (Lewellen [1972, p. 121]).Indeed, consistency in the benefit
formulas is one of the key conditions for tax qualificationof a plan.Other
types of deferred compensation which arediscussed below offer considerably
more flexibility. In our sample, on average pensionsaccount for about 15% of
9
the value of the compensation package.
9 Leweilen computes the after tax current equivalent of a pension as the
size of the annual premium the executive would have to pay were he to
purchase from an insurance company a retirement annuity equal in value and
similar in form to his pension promise. Each increase or decrease in benefits
is regarded as a separate pension award whose current equivalent begins at the
time the award is made, and continues thereafter up to the executive's anticipated
retirement age. It is assumed that the executive does not anticipate resigning
from the company. On this possibly controversial assumption, Lewellen notes, "Al-
though almost everyone can point to an example of a corporate officer who was either
lured away from or priced out of his job, the conclusion suggested by an examination
of proxy statements is that such occurences are quite infrequent when viewed in re-
lation to the entire senior managerial group." [1968, p. 25].— 15—
Becausethe pension component of compensation istypically determined
by a formula that applies to allemployees covered by the corporation's
pension plan, unless the plan is a definedcontribution plan and the contri-
butions are largely invested in stockof the firmitself,the executive's
claim on future pension benefits willnot depend importantly upon hisown
performance.A possible exception occurs whenpension benefits are highly
influenced by earnings during the lastfew years of service, so that firms
caninfluencethe size of the pension on the basisof past performance.
Butthe amount of latitude is limitedcompared to the other forms of execu=
tive compensation, so itseemsunlikely that in this case pensions play a
major role in tying compensation to performance.Furthermore, unlike stock
optiorand deferred compensation, the executivehas no legalguarantee that
highercompensation will follow an indication ofgood performance; any such
understanding is based on trust.
Deferred Compensation
Deferred compensation includes the value ofall arrangements ——other
than pensions —-thatpromise benefits at or after retirement. They
comprise about 13% of the total compensation package, onaverage. One
type of arrangement that is often used guarantees the executivea defined
benefit sum, the difference between that figure andany payments received
prior to his death being payable to his estate. In return for suchpromises,
certain restrictions are usually imposed on the executive'sactivities. The
Internal Revenue Service has ruled that as long as suchrestrictions are part
of the contract, so that forfeiture is possible inprinciple, the post—retire-
ment payments are not taxable until received. Thus, to theextent that
marginaltaxrates differ during the working life and at retirement, there
is an element of tax arbitrage in deferred compensationschemes.— 16-
Deferredcompensation takes a variety of forms, including profit-sharing
andthriftplans, as well as individual contractual schemes. Hence, deferred
compensation schemes are likely to be more closely tailored to the circumstances
of particular executives than are pension plans. With respect to the extent to
which they are stock based, deferred compensation packages are quite heterogeneous.
For example, the investment vehicles for thrift plans can vary from a imixed
portfolio of fixed income securities to one consisting solely of the firm's
stock. Unfortunately, in our data we are not able to distinguish between
those components of deferred compensation whose value are stock determined,
10
and those that are not.
When deferred compensation is defined in terms of benefits and is
vested, from the executive's viewpoint it is a close substitute to a
pension and will be desired for similar reasons. Occasionally, payment
is made contingent upon certain well-defined actions on the part of the
executive, such as staying with the firm a certain period or not working
for a competitor. A firm is likely to find deferred compensation
packages of this type attractive when there are a few easily monitored
potential future actions by the executive that it wishes to discourage.
It provides a means of providing a disincentive without subjecting the
executive to vai±ation in his income beyond his control. However, other
types of deferred compensation are tied to the value of the firm's stock.
These are similar, for our purposes, to stock options, which we discuss next. -—
10For purposes of computing the after-taxcurrent equivalent of deferred
compensation schemes, Lewellen assumesthat the most appropriate practical
alternative to a deferred pay contract is simply anaddition to the executive's
salary that is equally attractivein terms of its after—tax present value. In
contrast, for pensions the equivalencecriterion was the premium on an annuity.
This distinction is a consequence of the factthat deferred compensation arrange-
ments tend to be less centered on mortalityconsiderations than are pensions.- 17—
StockOptions
A stock option granted by a corporation to an executive is an agreement
that he may purchase from the firm, at any time within a stated period, a
given number of shares of its stock at a price specified on the date of grant-
ing. In the early 1970's, the tax rules stuJated that under certain conditions,11
the difference between the purchase price and later resale could be taxed at
capital gains rates.12 The specific elements of option agreements tend to vary
across firms and executives. For example, there may be implicit or explicit
restrictions placed on the resale of the stock acquired under the option. Stock
13 options account for about 8% of the value of total compensation in our sample.
Stock options relate the executive's income most directly to what the
stockholders care about, the value of the firm, but have the disadvantage of
exposing the executive to risk beyond his control. They are likely to be
favored by firms whose executives have wide latitude in the performance of
their duties and are difficult to monitor closely. Options will be most
attractive to executives who are relatively unaverse to risk, and the stock
value of whose firms is relatively unaffected by random variables beyond
the executive's control.
11 For example, the option must be non-transferable, must be exercised
within a certain number of years after it is granted, etc.
12 During our sample period, the maximumcapitalgains tax rate was 35%.
13 Lewellen values the option as a function of the difference between the
option price to which the executive is entitled and the market price when
the option is exercised. In order to account for the possibility that the
executive may die before the option is granted, standard mortality tables
are used to compute actuarial equivalents of the payments.—
3.1.2Company Characteristics
Information on company characteristics such as size and complexity is
required in order to explain patterns of executive compensation. Specifically,
we need data that indicate the uncertainty and complexity of the environment
in which the executive is operating, because these will determine the import-
ance of bonding considerations in the construction of the pay package. The
following variables (all of which were constructed from data obtained from
Standard andPoor'sCompustat tape), were selected:
(i)A =thecost of advertising media andpromotionalexpenses
(millions of dollars);
(ii)L =number(thousands) of company employees as reportedto
shareholders;
(iii)W =netassets (millions of dollars);
(iv)R =researchand development expenditures (millions of dollars);
(v)V =varianceof the rate of return of the firm's common stock.
The varianrP of the stock's rate of return ovpr a T year period is
V (r)2
where r is the rate of return in year t ,definedas
=dt+4Pt_Pti
Pt-i
where P =closingcommon stock price in year t ,d
=dividendsper share,
.isa correctionfor changes in the consumer price index, and ris the— —
samplemean. Vt was calculated for several different values of T to insure
14 that the substantive results were not sensitive to the particular value chosen.
Obviously, these are imperfect indicators of the complexity of the environ-
ment in which the executive operates. For example, it would be possible to compute
more sophisticated measures of riskiness, taking advantage of the theory of Eff i-
cient markets. However, given that the reliability and robustness of such measures
are open to question (see, e.g., Cragg and Malkiel [1979]), this tack did not
seem worthwhile.
3.2 Estimation Issues
We seek to explain the shares of total compensation of each of four
categories:(1) salary plus bonus, (2) pensions, (3) deferred compensation,
and (4) stock options.The following simple econometric specification
is used:
2 R +y V. A.+y L +y W.+'( s.., = + AGE.+






where s.is the share of the th executive's total conipensation in the
2.th fo of compensation; AGEis his age; A ,L ,W ,R.,andV.
i i i i J. 1
arehis firm's advertising expenditures, labor force, net assets, research
and development expenditures, and variance of return, respectively; the RKk's
14 The results presented below use T=4 ,theyears being 1970 through 1973.— 20—
aredummy variables for rank;15 the y's are parameters, and is a
random error.
Wriat predictions does theory give concerning the signs of the '"s ? For
the coefficients on the AGE variables, the story is fairly straightforward.
Because older executives are likely to have a lower discount rate, they should
valuepost-retirment income more than their younger counterparts. Furthermore,
older executives are expected to be more averse to income variation ——they
haveless time for the "law of averages" to assert itself. Hence, the share
of pensions, which come in the future and are relatively safe, is expected to
increase with age. On the other hand, we expect the share of stock options,
the more risky type of compensation, to decline with age. In the absence of
information on tbe,specific nature of deferred compensation contracts, we can
makeno predictions with respect to howtheir share will vary with age.
Predicting the signs on the firm characteristics is more problematic.
The difficulty is that we do not know a priori which characteristics are
indicative primarily of situations in which monitoring problems are important,
and those which reflect environments in which firms are subject to a lot of
exogenous risk. For example, if it were known that firms with high research
and development expenses tended to have volatile profits for exogenous
reasons, our theory would predict a negative sign for R. in the stock
options equation.'6 However, because we do not have any basis for classifying
15 RK. is the ith_ranking executive in terms of total compensation; the
omitted category is the fifth rank.
16 As noted in Section 2.3, firms with high exogenous risk should not tie
compensation too closely to firm performance.— 21—
thefirm characteristics inth "monitoring"or "exogenous risk" categories,
no such predictions can be made. Hence, thesigns on the firm characteristics
cannot be used to "test" our theory.Instead, the theory is employed to
interpret the coefficients and investigate whetherany interesting patterns
emerge.
Each of the four share equations is estimated by ordinary leastsquares.
Because the shares must add up to unity, certain cross equation restrictions
on the coefficients are implied. However, when the same regressors (including
a constant term) are used in each equation, ordinary least squares estimation
guarantees that the constraints are satisfied.
Before presenting the results, several points need to be made regarding
the basic estimating equation:
1. Although there are four years of data for each executive, observations
are not entered on an annual basis. Ratbar, we average the values of the
variables over time, arid enter the means. The theory is not intended toex-
plain year-to—year fluctuations in compensation shares. Rather, it is
supposed to explain "permanent" traits of the compensation package as a
function of characteristics of the executive and of the firm. For the sake
of comparison, we estimated (3.1) with each of the yearly observations
entered separately. There are no important substantive differences. (These
results are available upon request.)
2. It may be the case that compensation practices differsystematical—
ly across industries. To explore this possibility, the firmswere grouped— 22—
17
into six industrial categories,and a set of regressions estimated with a
dummy variable for each category. The main qualitative results are not
changed very much by their inclusion. It is interesting to note, however,
some systematic differences that arise in compensation packages in different
industries.
3. The executive's marginal income tax rate is not included as an ex-
planatory variable. As suggested earlier, the incomes of the individuals
inthe sample are so high thatmost of them were paying the maximumtax rate,
18 andhence there was insufficient variation to obtain meaningful results.
3.3 Results
The basic results are reported in Table I. We first consider the signs
on A ,W,L,andV ,themeasures of firm size and complexity. A number of
interesting patterns are present. The shares of salary—bonus and pensions
are smaller for those companies in which advertising, total assets, labor
17 The categories are described in Appendix A.
18 In a set of equations not reported here, we included total comDensation
as a regressor, on the assumption that it might indicate the executive's
ability to benefit from tax arbitrage over time. Given this interpretation,
income has the expected sign: positive for deferred compensation and stock
options, and negative for the other types. However, such results must be in-
terpreted with caution, because total compensation is determined jointly with
its composition, and is therefore endogenous. See Masson 11971] for an empir-
ical study of the determinants of the total level of executive compensation.— 23—
force,and the variance of return are high; but larger for those firms in
which research arid development expenditures are high. Just the opposite is
the case in the share equations for deferred compensation and stock options. In
the context of our theory, these results suggest that high research and develop-
ment expenditures are associated with environments in which firm managers
face considerable amounts of exogenous uncertainty.On the other hand,
when total assets, labor force, and advertising expenditures are large, it
appears that monitoring considerations are more important than exogenous
risk. Similarly, a high variance of return appears to be associated with
firms where monitoring executives is difficult.
With respect to impact of age on the compensation structure., we ex-
pected that stock options should become less attractive as the executive
ages and pensions more attractive. According to the results in column (4),
starting in their mid 50's, executives receive a declining pcoportion of
their incomes in the form of stock options. According to column (2), the
proportion of income in pensions increases throughout the executive's work-
ing life.(The negative sign on the quadratic term does not dominate until
age 70.)
The coefficients on the rank dummies reveal a tendency for the higher
ranking executives to receive a greater proportion of their compensation in
stock options. We conjecture that this is because the higher the individual's
rank, the more important his job, and the greater the necessity to bond him to
the firm. In some experiments not reported here, we allowed for a set of
full interactions between rank and the other variables, but no interesting
patterns emerged.— 24—
TABLE I
Share'softhe Total Compensation Package*
* Variablesare defined in
values of t—statjstjcs.
(3) (4)






















































































































We turn now to the effects of controlling for industrial
category. These results are reported in Table II, in which
INDi is a dummy for the th industrialgroup listed in Appendix A. As
suggested by comparing the R2's of Table II with thoseof Table I, in-
clusion of the industry duniinies contributessignificantly to the explanatory
power of the equations. Generally, however, the mainqualitative features
of Table I remain intact. The coefficientson W ,RandVkeep the same
signs, but in a few cases those on A and Lchange. The "outliers" with
respect to compensation practices appear to be the electronicsindustry (IND4),
with.a very high reliance on stockoptions, andthemotor vehicles andparts
industry (IND5) with a commensuratelylarge use of current forms of compensa-
tion.
4.Conclusion
Designing an executive compensation package thatrewards actions that
are in the long-run interest of the stockholders isa complex problem. Firms
must take into consideration (1) theirability to discern unfortunate circurn-
stances from mismanagement; (2) the extent to whicha compensation package
forces the executive to face risks beyond hiscontrol; and (3) the willingness
of a particular executive to bear this risk. Ourtheoretical analysis suggest-
ed several criteria that are likely to affect thecomposition of an executive
compensation scheme: the age of the executive, firm characteristicsaffecting
the ability of the firm to monitor executive behavior andthe extent to which
the firm faces a high degree of exogenousuncertainty. We found that relatively
safe forms of delayed compensation (pensions)were more intensively used for
older executives, who value a high level ofdelayed compensation more but are less
tolerant of uncertainty about this income.Younger executives, on the other hand,TABLE II
Shares of the Total Compensation Package: Industry Dummies Included*
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deferred Stock
Salary ÷ Bonus Pensions Compensation Options
AGE .167 .0341 —.235 .0336
(2.82) (0.96) (4.37) (0.85)
AGE2 -.00166 -.000236 .00221 -.000312
(4.46) (0.74) (4.62) (0.89)
A 4564X1f5 —.000105 .00195 —.000860
(0.11) (3.02) (3.74) (2.24)
W 3.87Sxl05-6.878>109.221o1.5310
(2.53) (5.27) (4.68) (1.06)
L .000111 _7419x10-5 1025x10-5-2.6740
(1.78) (1.40) (0.13) (0.45'
R .000914 .00151 —.00210 —.000320
(2.46) (4.78) (4.42) (0.91)
V —1.247 —.408 .728 .928
(5.74) (2.21) (2.61) (4.52)
—0.037 —0.029 —.0051 .062
(1.38) (0.92) (0.15) (2.49)
—.065 —0.016 .0085 .072
(2.71) (0.76) (0.28) (3.18)
RK3 —.046 —.0025 —.0017 .050
(1.91) (0.12) (0.06) (2.20)
—0.39 0.014 .0008 .052
(1.64) (0.72) (.03) (2.35)
ID1 0.0748 .0214 —.132 .0358
(2.42) (.81) (3.32) (1.22)
flD2 —0.01)8 —.0803 .106 —.0143
(0.45) (3.56) (3.13) (0.57)
IND3 0. 0566 ..00744 —.0168 —.0472
(2.24) (0.35) (0.52) (1.98)
ID4 I —0.151 .0209 —.0 553 .16
(4.37) (.71) (1.25' (5.68)
Ij5 0.165 —.0290 —.0757 —.0606
(5.85) (1.21) (2.09) (2.27)
CONSTANT —3.31 —.873 6.103 —.917
(2.82) (0.87) (4.04) (0.82)
R2 .81 .45 .67 56
N. of Observations 108 108 108 108
*Seenote to Table I.— 27—
weremore likely to receive compensation in the form of stockoptions.
Salary and bonus and pensions were used more in firms with fewer
workers, low assets, less advertising expenditure and a low variance of
rate of return. If our theory is correct, these characteristicsare
indicative of situations in which monitoring costs arerelatively low. A
high level of expenditure on research and development also led to a heavier
reliance on these forms of compensation. Our explanation is that firms in
which research and development is significant tend to besubject to large
exoyenous uncertainties. In such firms, linking executive compensation too
much to firm performance exposes the executive to substantial risk. The
risk premium required to offset this risk limits the extent to which
it makes sense for the firm to bond the executive'sinterests to its own.
A maintained hypothesis in our analysis has been thatfirms establish
compensation schemes optimally given their own characteristicsand those
of their executives. it would be useful to examinethe effects of
alternative compensation schemes on firm performance.For example, to
what extent does increased use of stock optionsimprove firm performance?
Other firm characteristics must be heldconstant, of course.
We conclude by noting that we have examined the issue of executive
compensation in a particular cultural context, and have considered a
limited array of mechanisms to reward executives. An interesting topic for
research would be a cross—country examination of executive compensation and
performance that takes into account different tenure structures and attitudes
toward executive-firm relations. Perhaps these have allowed a greater bonding
of interests between executive and firm without a conconmitant increase in the
executivesexposure to risk.— 28
Appendix A
The empirical work is based upon data from the following firms.(They
are grouped by the industrial categoryspecified in the Compustat tape. Category
6 is "miscellaneous.")








2. American Cyanamid Corporation
Procter and Gamble Company
Dw Chemical Corporation
DuPont
3. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company
GeneralTire andRubber Company
Goodrich(B.F.) Company
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